Reported To Be Alive - Abandoned In Laos

Reflection on POW/MIA Issues from Laos

Compiled by: Don Moody

Recently an acquaintance from my early days in Laos, an intell type who had spent many years in Southeast Asia, sparked my interest in Laotian POWs. Especially when he reported that he had reliable information that Raven FACs who had been shot down were living in captivity, specifically Henry Allen. What I found in my research on POWs and MIAs in Laos is appalling.

That we would leave anyone behind is unbelievable to me and that is why I think the following information is very important. The U.S. Government owes the families of these POWs and MIAs a personal and official explanation.

It is significant to note that there are several reports that give the number of American prisoners held at specific locations in Laos. More significant, however, is the CIA's designation of these camps as confirmed prison camps. Why weren't these prisoners returned in 1973 and where are they today? Someone knows the answer to these questions. The burden of responsibility to obtain answers rests squarely on the shoulders of the United States government. To date, they have not fulfilled that responsibility.

The following information was taken from the congressional record.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 21 (09/21/92)
 
MEN LEFT BEHIND IN INDOCHINA, SCHLESINGER, LAIRD SAY
Two men who held the title secretary of defense during the Vietnam War
say they have reason to believe that U.S. servicemen were left behind in
Indochina.
 
James R. Schlesinger, who served as director of the Central Intelligence
Agency in 1973 and as secretary of defense in 1973-1974, told the Senate
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs during a September 21 hearing that "I
can come to no other conclusion than those men were left behind in 1973."
But he added that he had no information that any are left alive today.
 
Melvin R. Laird, who served as secretary of defense from 1969-1973, told the
Panel that he had had "hard intelligence" that indicated perhaps 20 U.S.
Servicemen were held in Laos in 1973. He said he had always had the "gut
feeling" that the lists of captive U.S. servicemen provided by the
Vietnamese had been incomplete.
 
Both Laird and Schlesinger pointed to the weakness of the U.S. negotiating
position with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong at the time. Laird said
there could not have been any guarantee of a satisfactory solution if the
United States had made a public issue of the discrepancies in their own
versus the Vietnamese lists of men believed to be captive.
Winston Lord, who worked for Henry Kissinger at both the National Security
Council and the State Department during the 1970s, told the committee that
1he final peace agreement between the United States and North Vietnam "was
the best possible one at the time, given the mood in America and the
pressures on the U.S. side.
 
"The president in the end decided not to scuttle the agreement and resume
the war over the MIA (missing-in-action) question. It was a very difficult
Decision. I believed then it was the correct one. I believe that still. We
did not have conclusive proof...although we had strongly suggestive
intelligence that the lists were incomplete. American public opinion would
have blown apart if the president overturned the agreement and resumed the
fighting."
 
FINAL HEARINGS OF POW/MIA COMMITTEE SET FOR DECEMBER 1-4
 
The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs will hold its
last round of hearings December 1-4, Chairman John F. Kerry (Democrat of
Massachusetts) and Vice Chairman Bob Smith (Republican of New Hampshire)
announced November 27.
 
Following is the text of their statement:
“The hearings will focus on progress made on working with families and in
conducting operations in Southeast Asia since the Committee began its
investigation last November. The hearings also will examine private
efforts on behalf of POW/MIAs, and take a critical took at intelligence
operations.”
 

Perhaps it can all be summed up by a statement made by a former POW: "I was prepared to fight, to be wounded, to be captured and even prepared to die, but I was not prepared to be abandoned."

Live-Sighting Reports

On 4 July 1969, Colonel Patrick Fallon, Vice Commander of the 56^th SOW, was checking out enemy activity near the town of Xieng Khouang at the edge of the Plain of Jars in Northern Laos. He was the lead aircraft in a flight of two A-1s, Firefly 26 and 27.

Colonel Fallon took his plane down low to observe the Pathet Lao positions, circled and came back for another pass. Colonel Fallon’s plane was hit by enemy ground fire while flying only about 100 feet above ground, but Fallon was able to successfully bail out. Colonel Fallon reached the ground safely between two 4500 foot ridges. He was able to maintain radio contact with the SAR aircraft circling above, but they were unable to rescue him because of intense enemy ground fire in the area. Finally the enemy began to converge on Colonel Fallon’s position, and his last transmission was "Put it all around me, I'm hit." Through the years, reports have surfaced referring to Fallon as a prisoner of war in Laos.

By late 1979, the evidence was clear that American POWs remained alive in Laos. Intercepted communist transmissions concerning their U.S. captives had electrified the Pentagon. "Col. Picinich [of the DIA] was visibly excited about these events. It is the opinion of that office that U.S. POWs were in fact still alive in Southeast Asia," wrote a Pentagon official following a December 12, 1979, briefing on the intercepted messages.

The signals' intelligence was backed up by strong evidence from human sources. The Pentagon had begun receiving several reports of U.S. POWs in a specific area of Laos. One of the U.S. sources was described as "a sensitive source with unusually good access. This "sensitive source", reportedly a Laotian woman with access to top government officials, provided a series of reports detailing the presence of up to 30 American POWs at the camp.

In November 1979, a second source confirmed there were American POWs in the camp. The source, who passed a polygraph exam, reportedly got the information from a guard at the camp, who said one of the POWs was "Lt.Col. Paul W. Mercland". There is no POW/MIA with that name, but experts thought the name might really be a garbled version of Air Force POW/MIA Paul W. Bannon, American. It was later learned that the CIA also had a report of a Caucasian prisoner at the camp, but apparently did not share its intelligence with the Pentagon.

Following the lead of their human sources, the Pentagon soon trained its satellites on the region. There was an immediate hit. The imagery confirmed the location of a mysteriously isolated prison in the region. Based on the photography, CIA analysts determined the camp had been built between April 1978 and September 1979, and was occupied by December 1980. The camp, whose rustic features soon earned it the Pentagon nickname "Fort Apache", was located in a clearing off Route 12.

It was divided into inner and outer areas, both protected by stockade-type fences. The outer fence was about six to ten feet high. Behind the outer wall were fields of crops, guard barracks, a trench, a machine-gun nest, and two observation towers. The towers, with platforms 10 to 12 feet above the ground, were positioned so guards could look into the camp. The inner compound, also surrounded by a tall fence, contained five buildings, including two large barracks. The CIA analysts confirmed that the camp was designed to keep people in, rather than keeping guerillas or animals out.

There were two other striking things about the camp:

1. First, according to some reports, the photos indicated that some of the prisoners were much taller than others in the camp, and rested by sitting with their ankles crossed rather than squatting Asian-style. They also used tools which were too big for the average Laotian.
2. The second remarkable thing about the camp could be seen in the vegetable plots between the inner and outer fences. It was what appeared to be a big "52". "Each number is 1-2 meters wide and 3 meters high. The two numerals are such that they most likely cannot be seen from either of the two observation towers, because of trees located in the line of sight," the CIA reported.

In addition, it appeared possible that the letter "K" followed the "52". In other words, it looked as if someone had hacked a signal into the ground that could be seen from the air, but not from the camp's guard towers. The CIA said "That it is conceivable that it represents an attempt by a prisoner to signal to any aircraft that might pass overhead."

The significance of the "K" was clear - it was a sign used by downed American pilots to signal distress. The "52", although a much clearer signal, had a more elusive meaning. Some experts thought it represented the number of POWs in the camp. Others believed it was intended to show B-52 bomber crewmen were being held.

Years later, one source claimed that "52" was a symbol used by U.S. briefers on maps of Vietnam during the war to denote U.S. POWs camps, so they wouldn't be bombed by B-52 crews. Whatever it meant, the "52" was clearly a man-made signal in a camp reported by other sources to hold U.S. POWs.

NOTE: The DIA agreed the "52" was man-made when it was first detected, but later claimed it was really just a coincidental feature of the landscape.

The satellite photos set the Pentagon scrambling - But it was already too late. The POWs had been moved. Perhaps the communists learned of America's interest in "Fort Apache". Or maybe they were just practicing good scrutiny. But the "sensitive source" reported that because of security concerns, the POWs were moved from Laos to Vietnam by the end of January 1981.

The NSA (National Security Agency) had already reported an intercepted communist radio transmission, which, if not referring to the Nhom Marrot prisoners, reflected concerns about other U.S. POWs. The transmission went out on Dec. 27, 1980: "Refer to the Politburo, Ministry of Defense, that because U.S. and Thai POWs have been identified by [CENSORED] they will be removed from Attopeu Province. Aircraft will pick up POWs at the airfield on 28 December at 12:30 hours. By February 1981, the "52" had begun to fade away at "Fort Apache"

For the past 30 years, there has been nothing more tantalizing for POW/MIA families than reports that Americans have been seen alive in Southeast Asia and nothing more frustrating than the failure of these reports to become manifest in the form of a returning American.

A live-sighting report is just that--a report that an American has been seen alive in Laos in circumstances which are not readily explained. Such is the case of Captains Henry Allen (In the Photo) and Richard Elzinga Raven FACs shot down in 1970. The report could come from a refugee, boat person, traveler or anyone else in a position to make such an observation. The information could be first-hand or hearsay; it could involve one American or many; it could be detailed or vague; it could be recent or as far back as the end of the war.

What makes things difficult is the Ravens were part of a classified project and their being in-country as combatants was Top Secret. This made it difficult to negotiate for someone who in theory wasn’t there.

Abandoned in Laos

Roger Hall a pre-Vietnam veteran and an information researcher wrote the following report. He has been involved in POW/MIA research since 1993 and is a graduate student at the University of Maryland, University College. The following information first appeared in the Conservative Review.

American POWs known to have been held captive by the communist Pathet Lao were abandoned in Laos in 1973. When the United States withdrew the last of our fighting forces from Vietnam on March 28, 1973, Americans that were then prisoners from secret operations in Laos during the Vietnam War were abandoned to the Lao Patriotic Front, the political group of whom the Pathet Lao were the fighting forces. This was the result, not the intent, of withdrawing U.S. troops under the Paris Peace Agreement to secure the release of the named POWs; it is also the result of not negotiating with the LPF for prisoners they held in the mistaken belief that north Vietnam would deliver them to us.
The Laotians have made proving that Americans are in captivity there difficult at best and seemingly impossible under international law. The communists are masters at keeping and hiding American POWs. They have it down to a science. At the suspicion that a location was known or would become known because of an escape or for any other reason, American prisoners would be moved. Prisoners were held in the most secure areas where they were under heavy guard by troops. They were usually held in caves that also served military functions where they could be hidden, controlled and protected from recovery. NOTE: This may be the case of Sam Deichelman, a Raven FAC who disappeared on a flight from SVN to his base in Laos in September of 1968.

No one captured by the Pathet Lao during the war was ever released. Only two Americans escaped and were recovered from the Pathet Lao during the Vietnam War. Navy Lt. Charles Klussman, shot down on June 6, 1964 over the Plain of Jars, had the fortunate distinction of being the first POW to escape from the Pathet Lao. Navy Pilot Dieter Dengler, shot down on February 2, 1965, was captured by the Pathet Lao and held prisoner with two Americans; Gene Debruin, a civilian, and Lt. Duane Martin, a helicopter pilot. Martin was reported by Dengler as possibly killed while evading after the escape. President Nixon in 1973 was under great pressure from the U.S. Congress, the POW/MIA family members and the public to bring the war to an end and have the POWs released. Congress had passed the Cooper-Church Amendment that cut off all funding for further military action, which prevented enforcement of the Paris Peace Agreement.

Due to the public's demand to end the war, delayed release of the known POWs was not a risk that the administration decision makers were likely to take. No one informed the Congress or the American people that there were captives that had not been released from Southeast Asia and the country turned its back on the POWs in Laos. As the years passed from 1973, the fate of these individuals seemingly became less and less important.

The Secret War in Laos

The United States fought a secret war in Laos in support of the Royal Laotian Government from 1962 through 1973 against the communist Pathet Lao. Laos was in the North Vietnamese theater of operations, where the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao fought battles against the U.S.-supported noncommunist Laotians. Under the 1962 Geneva Agreement, both the U.S. and the North Vietnamese were obliged not to position regular combat troops in Laos.

This secret war was managed by the military role of the CIA out of the American Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, under the authority of the U.S. Ambassador. Presidential authority authorized the ambassador to manage and conduct military operations that included U.S. military aircraft and personnel, but excluded the U.S. military from any decision making in their use. The separate though interrelated bombing of Hanoi's supply pipeline to their forces in South Vietnam using the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos was under the control of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV).
The Paris Peace Agreement was signed on January 27, 1973 and the names of POWs captured in Vietnam were given to U.S. representatives. On February 1, U.S. negotiators exchanged a letter form President Nixon agreeing to pay the Vietnamese $3.25 billion in reconstruction aid in return for the un-negotiated "Laos list" of names of American POWs captured in Laos who were to be released. The $3.25 billion was for reconstruction in Vietnam; there was no consideration for Laos.

Although North Vietnamese forces controlled over 85% of the territory in Laos where Americans were missing in action and had advisors attached to all Pathet Lao units, the list handed over by the North Vietnamese contained the names of only nine Americans and one Canadian POW captured in Laos and held in Hanoi. These were the only POWs from Laos to be released. There was "a firm and unequivocal understanding that all American prisoners in Laos will be released within 60 days of the signing of the Vietnam agreement."

The U.S. knew that the Pathet Lao had information on many of the American POW/MIAs in Laos. Of the 10 POWs released under the Vietnam agreement, none were from Pathet Lao POW camps, and the Pathet Lao insisted that they held prisoners in Laos that would only be released by them. The fighting between the Royal Laotian Government and Pathet Lao ended when the Laos cease-fire was signed by the Laotian Parties in Vientiane on February 21, 1973. The agreement stated that 60 days after the coalition government was formed all POWs would be released. This was the fall-back agreement the U.S. hoped to use to have U.S. POWs held in Laos released. This was in addition to the Paris Peace Accords.

The Pathet Lao were under the direct military supervision of their communist North Vietnamese cadres, even more so than the South Vietnamese and the Royal Laotian Government were under the influence of the United States. During the peace negotiations, Henry Kissinger had insisted that the Vietnamese be responsible for all prisoners in Southeast Asia. This had been one of the points Le Duc Tho, the North Vietnamese negotiator, would not agree to, claiming that Laos was a sovereign nation and would be responsible for their own prisoners. Although the North Vietnamese did then and possibly now influence the POW/MIA policy of Laos, efforts for the release of known POWs from the Pathet Lao failed.

Record of U.S. POWs in Laos

Vietnam War era CIA reports state that American POWs captured in Northern Laos are "escorted to prisons in Houa Phan/Sam Nuea/province where they are detained on a semi-permanent basis or transferred to North Vietnam." What follows here are reports of Pathet Lao held POWs in the Laotian theater of operations and does not include the MACV area of operations in Laos. The Pathet Lao held American POWs in numerous locations, including the Pathet Lao Headquarters at Sam Nuea and at more than one location at Ban Nakay. Declassified CIA documents from 1967-1972 show that there were up to 60 or more U.S. POWs held by the Pathet Lao during the Vietnam War who were never released.

Reports entitled "Enemy Prisons in Laos," "Estimated Enemy Prison Facilities in Laos," and "Estimated Enemy Prison Order of Battle in Laos" provide information from sources on communist Pathet Lao POW camps holding prisoners described as Pilots, Caucasian and American. Reports were updated as new intelligence was obtained.

There is also a 1969 Seventh Air Force report "POW Camps Listing for Laos", describing all locations listed that had been validated for inclusion by appropriate authority at the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane in coordination with the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). The JPRC was responsible for the reporting and tracking of all missing and captured Americans under the code name "BRIGHT LIGHT". Another report, the "1972 Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific, Laos Prisoner of War Camp Study", is a compilation of overhead photographic imagery of all known POW Camps in Laos. These two reports incorporated the CIA intelligence products, and were backed up with the original source reports.

Known and Suspected American POWs Under Pathet Lao Control:
(Listed by year, organization and number of POWs)

1966 - CIA - 8 American POWs
1967 - CIA - 15 American POWs
1968 - CIA - 13 American POWs
1969 - CIA - 45 American POWs
1969 - USAF - 61 American POWs
1970 - CIA - 28-30 American POWs
1971 - CIA - 24-30 American POWs
1972 NAVY high altitude photography of known and suspected POW Camps in Laos was not released.

CIA POW/MIA reporting decreased after 1969. This was at a time when the military was still losing aircraft and pilots and others, both civilian and military, were being lost on the ground. Many POW camps had been observed for long periods of time, some for years. On March 11, 1968, the communists attacked a U.S. Tactical Air Navigation System (TACAN) and a TSQ 81 RADAR bomb facility at Phu Pha Thi, also known as Lima Site 85, in northern Laos. General Singkapo, the former commander of all Pathet Lao Forces during the war is quoted in an August 21, 1990, interview with Dr. Timothy Castle, author of At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, as saying that about 100 Pathet Lao and more than 200 North Vietnamese attacked Lima Site 85 and that two or three Americans were captured at the site and sent to Vietnam. Also in 1968, reports were received by the CIA in Laos that all American POWs were being sent to Hanoi for a prisoner exchange. Twenty-seven Americans that were held prisoner by the Pathet Lao in four different POW camps were moved to Ban Hang Long, Houa Phan Province, and were supposed to represent all Americans held by the Pathet Lao. CIA POW reporting shown above indicates not all were sent.

On October 11, 1969, overhead photography taken by a Buffalo Hunter reconnaissance drone of Ban Nakay Teu, revealed 20 non-Asians accompanied by Pathet Lao guards near caves at Ban Nakay Teu. CIA analysis of the prisoners determined them to be Caucasian. There had been numerous ground reports identifying these people as Americans both prior to and after the overhead reconnaissance.

In 1971, Secretary of Defense Laird was not satisfied with the limited information he was receiving on the POWs in Laos. He sent General Vessey to Laos to assist in operations there and offer military intelligence assets in the gathering of POW/MIA information. U.S. Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley, refused the offer of military intelligence assistance and informed DOD that all POW reporting requirements could be handled by the embassy.

President Nixon was notified by Henry Kissinger at the White House on March 19, 1973, that "The U.S. Embassy in Vientiane has been told by the Pathet Lao that the U.S. prisoners of war in Laos will be released by the Lao Communists in Laos and not by the Vietnamese in Hanoi."

On March 22, Ambassador Godley cabled the Secretary of State and the White House that "We believe the Laotian Popular Front (LPF) holds throughout Laos more prisoners than are found on the North Vietnamese lists. We do not believe it is reasonable to expect the LPF to be able to produce an accurate total POW list by March 28; the LPF just has not focused on the POW repatriation and accounting problem until very recently and probably cannot collect in the next few days, the information we require." It was realized, based on the number of people known to have been alive on the ground and captured, that additional prisoners should be released from Laos. Admiral Moorer, on Presidents Nixon's authority, ordered a halt to the troop withdrawal because the Pathet Lao had not released any of the expected POW/MIAs. The next day the Four Party Joint Military Commission informed the White House of the North Vietnamese position that the U.S. "must bear full responsibility for any delay in return of POWs."

Ambassador Godley advised the State Department and the White House to get the nine out now and we would get the rest out later, that "a bird in the hand was worth two in the bush." President Nixon reversed his decision and the troop withdrawal was resumed.

The White House memorandum for the President of March 24, 1973, from Henry Kissinger included the statement of the Chief North Vietnamese Delegate that "The question of military personnel captured in Laos can in no way be associated with the Paris Peace Agreement and withdrawal of U.S. troops." This should have been noted as a sign that the North Vietnamese were not going to adhere to their responsibility for all POWs in Southeast Asia as the President and the public had been informed." Although the Pathet Lao had insisted that "prisoners captured in Laos would be returned in Laos," the nine Americans and one Canadian whose names were on the Laos list were released at Gia Lam Airport in Hanoi on 28 March 1973. The head of the Pathet Lao delegation, Lt.Col. Thoong Sing, was present for the release of the POWs. The LPF must have been amazed, if not offended, at the refusal of the United States to seriously negotiate with them.

The withdrawal of U.S. troops was also completed on March 28th. Our military strength was down to 5,300 troops as of March 22nd. The North Vietnamese had left 10 divisions in South Vietnam and had been bringing a continuous flow of troops and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in violation of the Paris Peace Accords.

Ambassador Godley had never spoken to the Pathet Lao spokesman Sot Petrasy, who also had the rank of Ambassador. He had repeatedly stated the Pathet Lao were not to be believed and were just lackeys of the Vietnamese, a very severe approach to have taken with those who were holding American prisoners.

Ambassador Godley accepted the Pathet Lao statement that all POWs captured in Laos had been released to suit his requirements for the troop withdrawal and POW release under the Paris accords. The quick acceptance of the new Pathet Lao claim was in complete contradiction of the American embassy's stated 10-year position that the Pathet Lao could not be believed and would make political statements to suit their needs.

Major General Richard V. Secord, who in 1967-68 was “Chief of Air” for the CIA Station in Laos, was called to testify before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in 1992. He recalled that CIA and other prison camp reports were not considered in Ambassador Godley's attempts to inquire of American POWs in Laos. The tracking by the CIA of Americans believed held captive in Laos was an ongoing task at the Embassy. The fact that Americans were being held was widely known; the problem was where were they being held, as the prisoners were moved frequently. This created some problems as prisoners who were known by name at a particular location would now become unknowns and make it almost impossible to identify specific individuals at each of the prison sites.

General Secord expressed his personal view that Americans had been left behind in Laos. He further testified, with respect to the POW's, that the CIA had been tracking as carefully as they could all the intelligence information available on POW's in Laos, especially after it became clear that there was going to be a Paris Peace Agreement.

Secord was confident that there was a considerable number of U.S. POW's in Laos during and after the war. For instance, there was the case of David Hrdlicka and two other POWs that were known to be held by the Pathet Lao. General Secord had personal knowledge of these men because he was involved in an abortive attempt to rescue these guys back in late '66 or '67. He knew that they existed and were alive because of an agent the CIA had inside the prison camp. “We knew their names, we knew where they were.” It must be noted that none of these POWs have ever been heard from since the Paris Accords.

However, it is known with a reasonable level of certainty, that in addition to these guys there were more of our people still held in Laos after the exchange of prisoners. In spite of the known captivity of POWs such as Hrdlicka, Shelton, Debruin and the POW camp reporting of 20 to 60 captive Americans, it was the lack of positive identification of POWs at specific prison sites that was the deciding factor to accept the 10 POWs from Laos held in Hanoi and proceed with the prisoner exchange and troop withdrawal.

David Hrdlicka (shown in photo at time of capture), a F-105 pilot shot down on May 18, 1965, had made public statements that were published in Pathet Lao newspapers and broadcast on Pathet Lao radio. Charles Shelton was downed on April 29, 1965. These two men were known to be held together in a cave southeast of Sam Nuea. In the CIAs attempted rescue of the men at Sam Nuea, one of them actually made it to a recovery area before being recaptured. In another attempt, Eugene Debruin and Duane Martin escaped with Dieter Dengler but were separated from Dengler and their fate remains unknown.

The war had been fought to decide who would rule in Laos. A U.S. decision, after the signing of the Lao cease fire, to "not complicate" Lao negotiations with the U.S. POW issue proved wrong. Since March 1971, "The United States Government has scrupulously refrained from introducing complicating issues such as American POWs" into the Lao internal talks. The U.S. requested in 1972 that Souvana Phouma inquire about our POWs, but the Royal Lao Government was seen as lackeys of the United States "interventionists."

Admiral Moorer informed the chief delegate of the FPJMC in Saigon on March 23rd that "we intend to pursue the question of other U.S. personnel captured or missing in Laos following the release of the men on the 1 February List." Unfortunately, the LPF were not members of the Commission for the recovery of American MIAs as were North Vietnam, South Vietnam and the Viet Cong.

The captives held by the Pathet Lao in Laos were left without further efforts for their release because Congress had cut off funding for further action in Southeast Asia. There was no way to enforce our demands and the communists knew it. Congress was not informed of the captive Americans from the secret war who were thought to have been sent to fight in Vietnam.

President Nixon on March 29, 1973, stated on national television that "All of our POWs are on their way home." On April 12, deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Roger Shields announced that "DOD had no specific knowledge indicating that any U.S. personnel were still alive in and held prisoner in Southeast Asia." These two announcements signaled the end of the release of POWs under the Paris Peace Accords.

On May 18, Admiral Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations, informed Admiral Thomas Moorer, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the Laotians' inability to reach political agreements "has effectively arrested any movement toward an environment in which the status of Americans missing in action in Laos can be resolved. I am informed that the Central Intelligence Agency is pursuing a 'highest priority effort' directed at specifically determining what has happened to US MIAs in Laos. In View of the direct and personnel interest the Services have in this matter, I recommend that the JCS receive a briefing from the CIA on their effort in this area so that we may be confident this important humanitarian issue is receiving appropriate attention."

Lt. Gen. Deane, Jr., USA Acting Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency advised Admiral Moorer at the time that the CIA collection effort in Laos is carried out by CIA assets, and within the organizational structure, of the CIA station in Laos. DIA is collaborating closely where appropriate with CIA in regard to the current situation in Laos. A summary of the present POW/MIA situation in Laos as held in DIA files is as follows:

• At present there are approximately 350 U.S. military and civilians listed as missing in action in Laos. Of this total, approximately 215 were lost under such circumstances that the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) probably has information regarding their fate.

• Previous LPF mention of U.S. POWs detained in Laos includes a statement on 3 October 1967, by the Pathet Lao Radio, that between 17 May and 16 September 1967, the Pathet Lao had 'captured about a dozen U.S. pilots.

Furthermore, on 2 February 1971, LPF spokesman Sot Petrasy commented that "Quelques Dixaines." ("Some Tens") of prisoners were being held by the Pathet Lao. The LPF has provided no accounting for U.S. personnel in its custody." The DIA was the lead POW/MIA agency and recommended that the JCS not be briefed on the covert CIA activities. The briefing never occurred. On Wednesday May 23, 1973, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho agreed that, while not stating acceptance on the U.S. statement that Article 8 (b) [POW/MIAs] applied to all of Indochina, Le Duc Tho would not contradict him publicly either. In return, the U.S. would not hold Vietnam to this because Vietnam had to cooperate with their Lao friends. This side-agreement has complicated negotiations in Laos to this very day.

Then a June 9th White House memorandum from the situation room informed Henry Kissinger that "The Pathet Lao chief representative in Vientiane told our Embassy officer that further information on two acknowledged POWs (Hrdlicka and Debruin) must await the formation of a new coalition government in Laos."

In June 1973, a White House message from Henry Kissinger to the American Embassy Charge d'Affairs John Gunther Dean stated "Le Duc Tho complained to me last week that you had mentioned US-DRV understanding regarding U.S. prisoners captured in Laos in your talk with Phoumi Vongvichit. We obviously cannot afford to give Hanoi this sort of grounds on which to abort their understanding with us."

The evidence that Americans were held in Laos was known at the time; however, it just wasn't considered in negotiations. The National Security Council, Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) headed by Henry Kissinger, received POW information from the CIA, the State Department and the DOD, who were all members of the WSAG. But the U.S. government had a time table to keep for withdrawal of American fighting forces from Southeast Asia by March 28th under the Paris Peace Accords and the recovery of the reported Americans was put off for possible later efforts that never materialized.

The accepted loss of captured members of the U.S. armed forces and civilians by members of the U.S. government is almost beyond comprehension, but it did happen. The 27 American prisoners and other American POWs reportedly sent to North Vietnam seem also to have disappeared. They were not among the POWs on the February 1, 1973 Laos list who were never returned. Those who were returned had been captured from 1965 through 1972 and most were moved to North Vietnam at different times; the rest were withheld.

There were unusual situations in the 1968-69 time frame that could have a bearing on the POWs' fate. A possible prisoner exchange may have been in process and these men never put into the known Vietnamese prison system. That year, Richard Nixon became president and Ho Chi Minh died. The POWs could have been executed. However, they could also have been sent to the U.S.S.R. for third-country internment and/or technical exploitation.

There are reports of prisoners being transferred to other communist countries throughout the war period. One source of such reports was Jerry Mooney, a former Air Force/NSA analyst who tracked POWs moved through Vietnam and Laos and sent to Russia. The NSA had tracked POWs in Laos throughout the war and until 1975 when U.S. intelligence assets were pulled out. Former Czech General Jan Sejna, who defected from communist Czechoslovakia, and now works for DIA has firsthand knowledge that close to 100 Americans in good physical condition were transferred from Vietnam to Russia via Czechoslovakia. He monitored the program that processed them and observed their arrival and temporary confinement there.

Post-1973 declassified documentation includes live-sighting reports and satellite imagery of pilot distress signals. Though most live-sighting cases of American POWs in Laos have been debunked, some cannot be dismissed even though the information was often dated and the follow-up slow, requiring cooperation from Laotian officials. Satellite imagery, from 1973 through the present, of Laos reveals pilot distress signals of the form our servicemen were trained to display to signal their location and situation. Some identification codes do correlate to missing Americans.

POW/MIA Bracelets – Lest We Not Forget

In 1970, long before the Vietnam War ended, Americans were introduced to the first bracelets bearing the name, rank and incident date of an American serviceman who was listed as a Prisoner Of War or Missing In Action. Those bracelets were the brainchild of former Congressman Robert K. "Bob" Dornan of California. Mr. Dornan, a former Air Force fighter pilot, had a good friend who was captured by the Communist Pathet Lao forces. His friend Colonel David Hendricks was a well documented POW being held in the massive cave complex near Sam Neua, Laos.

During a meeting of POW-MIA family members and concerned citizens in California, Bob Dornan put forward an idea to modify the Montagnard friendship bracelet to one bearing the name of a missing American that would be used to publicize the plight of Prisoners Of War and those Missing In Action. Representatives of VIVA (Voices In Vital America), an early POW-MIA organization in Los Angeles, saw the benefit in Dornan's idea and arranged for the production and distribution of the bracelets. We were on the right track back in 1970, but somewhere along the line our thinking got derailed and the POW/MIA concern lost its momentum and real meaning.

Reported To Be Alive

The issue - American Prisoners Of War are alive in Laos and our Government knows it!

Summer 1991: A flood of new evidence of live POWs pours from Southeast Asia: pictures, handwriting samples, hair samples, blood samples, fingerprints, footprints, maps and other physical proof. The Bush administration disregards the evidence and attempts to discredit it by rumor and innuendo. Some of the photos are scientifically validated, however, and have never been scientifically disproved!

2 Aug 1991: President Bush says: "Until we can account for every person missing we have to run-down these leads to prove that nobody is held." The President sees it as his duty to prove Vietnam and the Pathet Lao holds none of our citizens--rather than to gain their freedom.

Jan 1992: Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman David Boren: "I think we're going to see, potentially, that a lot more (POWs) were left in Laos... it's been true in administrations of both parties--when the agreements were made, and they were anxious to get agreements at the time--there were people involved that simply wanted to get the agreements and didn't want to have all the questions raised at that time... it was too embarrassing. The longer it went, the more embarrassing it got to be... A lot more information is going to come on Laos... Its things that happened over time. Then, once somebody found out how bad it was, nobody wanted to take the blow. They always thought, well. I'll hand this on to the next guy to admit that we really made a big mess... Those who knew the truth kept handing it on. There are people, obviously in the military and otherwise, in the foreign policy establishment, who feel they're going to be embarrassed now, if this comes out, and so they keep the secret... it has to come-out and it will."

Postscript

Did the Pathet Lao in their “own humanitarian way" spare the lives of those they captured? Are these men still serving some indeterminate sentence doomed to remain in Laos for following orders as a result of a Secret War? Laos today is a sovereign nation and the leaders in charge of the country are still those same despots who took power in 1973. It is widely believed that joint U.S.-Laotian-Vietnamese negotiations could prove rewarding if major U.S. decision-makers would only get involved.

Just before the Paris Accords were implemented, the CIA recommended a diplomatic track and a military track to be used in case leverage was needed in securing the release of the POWs in Laos. They knew, of course that the force option would be one that would be hard for the decision makers to take given the environment that existed back in the U.S. at the time. Nonetheless, it was feasible. Most of the diplomatic players at the time did not think that the force option was even remotely available because of Cooper-Church, but some obviously felt it was. While military action is no longer an option, there are still those who believe that a belated but true settlement could yield much information and maybe even a survivor.

The Joint Task Force for Full Accounting (JTF) is tasked to examine crash sites to determine if they contain human remains that can be recovered and identified, but there appears to be little if any emphasis on locating any surviving POWs. Even though the JTF effort is an admirable undertaking, much more is needed. The U.S. negotiating position must be changed to reflect the fact that there is substantive proof that American captives were alive in 1973 and possibly later. Some could very well still be alive today.

I recall the favorite toast of Green Beret Colonel Floyd “Jimmy” Thompson who spent nine years as a POW in several Vietnamese prison camps. He was recognized as the longest held POW ever. He recently passed away at age 69: "Here's to us, those like us, and there are damn few of us."

We need to put real meaning behind the aphorism “LEAVE NO MAN BEHIND”. Its time for us to bring our warriors home, “DEAD OR ALIVE”.

From: “The Raven” by Edgar Allen Poe

Take thy beak from out my heart, and take thy form from off my door!

Is there--is there balm in Gilead?--tell me--tell me, I implore!

" Quoth the Raven, "Nevermore."

APPENDIX “A”

U.S. POW/MIAs in LAOS Who May Have Survived

Prepared by the Office of Senator Bob Smith
Vice-Chairman, Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

December 1, 1992

This listing contains the names of U.S. personnel with the possibility of being alive in captivity in Laos, last known alive, or out of their aircraft after crashing or before it crashed. A handful of the cases involve incidents where the aircraft was later found on the ground with no signs of the crew. This listing is based on all-source U.S. intelligence and casualty reports, information provided by POWs who were returned, lists of POWs and/or last known alive personnel prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other information made available to the Vice-Chairman, Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Based on the high number of MIAs at the end of the war who are still unaccounted for, it is probable that a significant percentage of the MIAs actually survived their incident and could have been captured. Apparently, only the Vietnamese and Laotians would know their fate, as the U.S.